Category Archives: Politics / Geopolitics

Politics, international relations, economics, public perception, power, etc. It all winds up here.

18 U.S. Code § 793 – Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information

Quite a few high-profile instances of leaks, breaches, infractions, cracks and “extreme carelessness in the handling of” classified information have been in the news over the last few years, and while folks like to talk a lot of fluff about whether this or that instance was truly vile or truly virtuous, I’ve never actually seen anyone reference the underlying rules regarding defense information.

So here it is: 18 U.S. Code § 793

Cornell Law has the text posted here as well.

Las Vegas shooting prediction: Most casualties were not due to gunshot wounds

Looking over the data for large stampedes and crowd crush events at concerts and sporting events, and comparing this to what I know personally from a career spent mostly handling various weapons in a tactical environment, I expect that we will discover fairly soon that the vast majority of casualties during the Las Vegas shooting — both injuries and fatalities — were actually due to stampede, and not anything to do with gunshot wounds at all.

Of course, in the confusion this issue has become politicized to an absolutely ridiculous degree by various anti-gun factions, and much of the US and European media is loathe to report anything other than anti-gun statistics for the moment, so we are seeing language tailored to evoke images of hundreds of people with actual gunshot wounds and zero people with stampede injuries.

For example: “Shooter in Las Vegas [blah blah blah] over 500 wounded.” This makes the reader or listener immediately envision 500 people actually wounded, as in due to violent trauma — and deliberate violent trauma at that. Which in this case would be exclusively due to gunshot wounds. But we have never seen a breakdown of causes of bodily harm by type, and this data will take a while to assemble.

By the time we do see these stats most people will not really be interested because immigration in Europe or stubborn people in Madrid/Barcelona or NFL SJW activity or whatever else will steal the spotlight and public attention before then. In other words, people will be distracted with another issue-of-the-day by then and forget that the new factoids they see relate to a previous event they felt very strongly about at the time it occurred.

Watch for this one.

Asian Governments Making Social Moves Together

I expect Asian governments to manifest a low-key but characteristically firm and absolute (and often official) position against Islam. Actually, I don’t expect it, I’m watching it happen and just now recognizing a fairly uniform trend. Something is going on in Asia with regard to this, and I don’t know quite what it is, but there is no doubt that doors are closing all across Asia for Muslims in general.

I think the timing is not a coincidence — the nature of Islamic threats are changing, becoming more diffuse, and taking on a different character just as a new generation of indoctrination is beginning across the West and Asia.

  • Myanmar has found something much more compelling than mere domestic political expediency to engage in its current operations (ISIS returners, as are turning up in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, is one possibility).
  • China has begun confiscating the Koran and categorized it as a book containing extremist political sentiment.
  • Thailand is readying a firm move against the southern Muslim rebels — and at the same time ISIS returners are very effectively influencing the young generation throughout the old Pattani region.
  • Saudis and other donors are standing up madrasas throughout Malaysia and Indonesia, and the Malaysian government is both unable to stop the trend while at the same time higher-ups in Putrajaya are strangely blind to the problem while also complaining about it.
  • The Philippines is obviously on a “you’re with us or against us” path politically and socially. And a certain of portion of the younger Muslim generation today is much more willing to take that as a challenge instead of an offer to pledge fealty (or at least negotiate terms).
  • Japanese are, at least anecdotally, becoming increasingly uneasy with the idea of accepting any Muslims, even as guest workers. The striking thing there is that ten years ago (well after 9/11) the topic of religion would never have been mentioned discussing this issue socially, but now it is brought up. This change over the last year or two coincides with the first mosque in Kyoto trying to promote itself via online ads and Japanese demonstrating an instant and strong aversion to the very concept of proselytization. They are now in “wait and see” mode socially — to watch and see how things turn out in Europe.
  • South Koreans seem to be on the same page as the Japanese — the attitude toward Islam having soured considerably over the last five years or so. Once again, this is anecdotal, but the subject has come up more than once, and many South Koreans keep up with news of attacks in France, Sweden and the UK.
  • Indonesia is seeing the rise of extra-judicial Islamic enforcement gangs.
  • Malaysia is seeing a similar rise in extra-judicial Islamic enforcement gangs, but the effect is somewhat muted by considerable repression by the special police and more active engagement with the group leaders.
  • Returners, returners, returners. ISIS veterans are flooding into various part of Asia, fresh off a tour in Syria, North Africa, Iraq or Afghanistan with ISIS and keeping in touch with one another. Of course, nobody feels comfortable with that. Unlike in Europe, though, well-known jihadis are not left to their own devices and most go missing somewhere in transit — but it is clear and evident that many are still returning and building new lines of communication and influence locally.

Any one of these issues, from official government actions to simple social reactions, would be grounds for certain groups to rally large responses — Islamic groups as well as Western-based political groups with strong anti-Asian nationalist agendas (something I’ve always found very odd). But the only thing making the news is Myanmar right now, and that’s a pretty hopeless fight to try to pick in terms of political pressure. Myanmar is about as pliable as North Korea as long as China is on their side, and China is indeed on their side with regard to this detail.

I do not see a future where Asian governments will feel compelled to do anything other than increase their resistance to an increased domestic Muslim presence. I fully expect that religious questions will be incorporated on visa applications to places like China eventually (not that repression of religion is anything new there).

I have no idea how any of this is going to turn out, but I find this trend notable and the timing troubling. I don’t know exactly what is triggering this much activity just now (why not a decade ago?), but something is clearly going on. It could be the outcome of some government assessments, or simply a change in the domestic social outlook, or both — but something is going on with this. And, of course, it is impossible to say “they are wrong”. It is just what they are doing and I’m just pointing it out.

Trump on the DPRK: Exerting Maximal Regime Change Influence

Sitting within the target zone for a North Korean retaliation causes one to contemplate a bit on the state of things. Trump has doubled down on his bellicose rhetoric of “fire and fury” over the course of the last day, and quite a few people are flipping out, as anyone could have predicted. I have received several emails and calls from friends wishing me well if things go south, expressing hopes that various cabinet personalities can reel Trump in and so on.

All of this assumes Trump is nuts. That is far from an accurate portrayal of the situation.

Washington is faced with a very tough choice right now, but one that has only one real option available: Does Washington wait until American cities sit under nuclear threat from a country with a decision making apparatus that is only a single person deep (meaning, ultimately, the strike decision is left up to personal whim and intent), or does it sacrifice non-Americans to protect Americans?

Obviously, the choice is clear: risk Americans instead of risking Americans. To think that any other nation would do any differently is to believe we exist in a parallel universe where altruism reigns, feelings are reasonable goals of achievement and love conquers all. We do not live in that universe.

Let’s be clear: the US will not allow tens of millions of Americans to sit at risk of a North Korean leader who wishes to advance an extortion game against Washington. It will avert that by risking tens of thousands of foreign lives (mostly South Koreans, but also some Japanese and possibly Chinese as well). Even though I live within the zone that might get splatted, I really can’t see any other way for things to be — and let’s remember: this is tens of millions of American lives VS a few tens of thousands of foreigners from Washington’s perspective. Not much of a choice there, even if one is a hardcore humanitarian.

So now that we have established the American calculus, and we’re not deluding ourselves into thinking that management of a nuclear-armed, globally-strike capable North Korea is part of our menu of options, what is Trump going to do about this? How about get the Chinese or Russians to do something instead? Well, that route has already been explored and exhausted. The Chinese enjoy North Korea being a useful problem regionally, so do the South Koreans to some degree, the Russians love having the DPRK act as a consistent policy spoiler for everyone involved, and even the Japanese have leveraged the existence of North Korea from time to time. It was a useful problem for pretty much everyone for quite a long time, and that’s why it has been allowed to fester for so long.

But now things have gotten serious.

The US cannot wait longer than next spring to strike. The decision on exactly when to strike is dependent on weather, mostly. If the Americans believe that the advantage leans to their side in cold weather then we will see a strike sometime between late November and early March. If the advantage would go to the Americans in warmer months then we will see a strike sometime between now and December. Expect the US to ramp up a strike capability from now until whenever and just sit on it to mask the moment of their intent. Sure, nonessential being relocated from the American garrisons in South Korea would be a telltale sign, but I don’t know if Washington would even telegraph its intent that way rather than letting the chips fall where they may. This is serious business, after all. On the other hand, Washington may evacuate nonessential personnel right away and just remove that as an indicator all together very soon. Who knows.

Back to the rhetorical bit Trump threw out the other day and then doubled down on today…

Trump is doing everything but being explicit about his threat to either glass North Korea entirely or commit to a massive conventional strike that comes very close to that. Looking at Trump’s negotiating style since the 1980’s it is very likely that he intends to do exactly that if the situation does not improve — he is not known for bluffing. He also would not have made this decision alone. China has already stated that they would defend North Korea in the event of an American strike, so by elevating it to the level of an absolute conflict Trump is essentially guaranteeing that there would not be any chance for any action to escalate to becoming a regional war because there would not be a North Korea left to defend.

That sounds crazy, but it is not. It ensures a limited scope to the conflict from the start, and that is wise.

From the North Korean perspective, though, it does one more thing: it places every single leader and peasant and their families under threat of annihilation if Pyongyang does not change course in some way. The Chinese have been trying to effect a regime change in Pyongyang unsuccessfully for a few years now. Beijing can’t do it, it is very likely that nobody outside of North Korea can short of a war. Trump’s appeal to an absolute level of violence here is an overt signal to the North Koreans that it is up to them to effect regime change or face total annihilation. There is plenty of hidden opposition to Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang — but unless they feel that Trump is more dangerous to them than their own leader they are unlikely to feel motivated to move. After all, North Korea has had spats with the West hundreds of times over the last several decades — so often that there is almost a script for this sort of thing.

Trump is going off script. He is doing so to evoke a specific survival reaction in the upper leadership in Pyongyang, specifically a reaction against Kim Jong Un. This is probably the best chance anyone has of deposing him: turning his own leadership against him. They might die if they go against Kim Jong Un. They will certainly die if they go against Trump. This is how mutinies are made from the outside. On the outside chance that it comes to an American strike Trump has already guaranteed that a Chinese retaliation would be pointless. A massive strike (nuclear or conventional) would be a huge shock to the world, but the populations of the world are already experiencing hyperbolic rhetorical shock — when the volume has been turned up to 11 for so long there isn’t really anywhere left to go.

Trump is not crazy and his staff have certainly planned out (and are constantly revising) attack plans on North Korea designed to execute a strike devastating enough to limit the scope of any follow-on actions from anyone in the region. He has since moved on to working an influence play directly aimed at the North Korean leadership. This is how the game is played. People today are not used to being forced into situations where one bad option is balanced by an even worse one. Sometimes there is no unicorn to come save the day. The world is only going to turn more harsh in the coming decade — we probably will only remember this as a side show (if we even care to remember it at all).

The Yuan: Stealing from Piers to pay 保罗

So, indeed the Yuan was made into a reserve currency and the link-by-failure is already being established. It is interesting, though, that the bulk of the value transfer involved is coming from the Euro, not the Dollar or Yen. Linked by the IMF formally or not, though, if either the Euro or the Yuan fail over the mid-term the other will as well. The Chinese and Eurozone economies are intimately linked already, but were linked more by success than failure until now. That the failure of either is a very real possibility is too terrifying for the financial press to discuss, I think, and it is a political landmine public figures are trying very hard to avoid mentioning. It even seems that the made-up nature of Chinese government economic estimates isn’t even in the news much these days. You would think that little detail might enter into the discussion about adding a new currency to the IMF’s reserve currency group.

There is no longer a strong relationship among basic aspects of value assignment, legal ownership, practical control (that is, “real ownership”), vested business interest in terms of the performance value of concerns, and available goods and services in either the Eurozone or Chinese markets. While there are no recipes for economic success, there are several recipes for disaster (ask an economist about this — their responses tend to be as enlightening and humorous as they are depressing on reflection). A lack of correlation between various forms of utility values and assigned values is one of the disaster recipes. There is no easy way to fix this other than a kinetic re-establishment of property rights, and that means there is nothing left to do in the current situation than hope that when they do fail, they fail cleanly. But historically there is no such thing as a clean failure (in theory, of course, all sorts of lovely solutions exist).

Dropping an anvil on the overloaded camel’s back in the Eurozone or China would be rather easy at the moment, as both economies are in precarious situations. In fact, inducing a major market collapse would be so easy right now that failure is almost certain to come as the result of a deliberate action from an external player than by mere circumstance. The more players who realize this is true the more likely such an action becomes: why let a failure happen to you when you can be the one making it happen if the event is inevitable?

In describing the European and Chinese economic situations a financial analyst friend of mine used the phrase “poised to fail” (along with a lot of depressed-looking facepalming). When someone says that to a geopolitical analyst, though, ears perk up. There is always opportunity to be found in crisis, and sometimes when crisis is inevitable the best play is to be the cause of it yourself, because then you are the only one truly prepared. Consider the economic fallout of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008. A similar performance is absolutely not out of the question, nor is having some “terrorists” conveniently demonstrate the peaceful nature of some religion all over a ship in the Strait of Malacca at a perfectly horrible moment.

2007-2010 SPY chart

Rhetoric forces us to pretend that the August invasion of Georgia did not trigger a reassessment of risk in Eastern European carry trade loans, and instead believe that the already liquidated American subprime loans acted as a magical “contagion” that unfairly crushed the Eurozone. As if the European economies were not profoundly overleveraged and primed to implode.

There really isn’t anything to do about what is going on with the Yuan, really. This course was set about 20 years ago (yes, all the way back in 1995 — after the Cold War, after the first post-Tienanmen Square Five Year Plan was in action; as China started on its “Money is Good” -> “Expansion Above All” -> “Don’t Stop the Train” -> “WTO Rules? Screw the rules, I have money!” chain of policies). The general trend will continue, as none of the players seems to have any inkling of how to change the rules of the game — and the trend is of the end of a decades-long political and financial cycle. The way these stories end is never happy.

1984-2015 Money Base chart

Anyone who thinks that events since 2008 have been business as usual and that geopolitics plays no part in this because “its just a market hiccup” is deluded.

But!

Every end is a new beginning, and that’s what is really worth focusing on. That may sound like small comfort (and it is), but if you already know things are going to get worse before they get better, then at least you won’t find yourself sleeping in a bed of broken dreams. It is too soon to tell which way this Jenga tower is going to topple, but we are nearing the end of this round of the game.

China: Yuan Will Be a Reserve Currency, Come What May

EDIT: Indeed, it has been made a reserve currency, or at least it looks like announcements have already been made to pave the way.

The IMF is considering adding the Yuan to the group of reserve currencies. That would put it alongside the U.S. Dollar, the Japanese Yen, the English Pound, and the Euro in terms of “officially perceived” stash-your-value-here viability. As far as actual criteria for inclusion go, the Canadian Dollar, Australian Dollar, and very likely the Russian Ruble are probably actually closer to being genuine reserve currency material than the Chinese Yuan.

But… politics.

China is much closer to a total financial collapse and internal civil disruption* than recovery and stability in its current form. Long-term, of course, China will still be right where it is and the people there will still be Chinese (but there will eventually be far fewer of them, at least for a few generations). A Chinese collapse right now would be a major disaster for everyone. The commodity markets are depressed more than they have been for several decades (in relative terms, actually, I’m not sure that we actually have a post-WWII precedent for what is happening), energy is cheap, credit is massively overleveraged, and yet people aren’t buying enough stuff to keep the wheels spinning.

What does that have to do with the Yuan becoming a reserve currency? It does three things:

  • Gives China access to an external aggregate value device to prop up the yuan if necessary (links their economy to everyone else’s by failure, similar to the way subsidies can do this within a national economy). This effect is actually more a hoped-for psychological effect on the market than a tangible superpower China is being granted by the rays of a yellow sun.
  • Makes the Yuan a necessary holding for anyone trying to carry a balanced basket of reserve currencies (temporarily spikes demand for the Yuan).
  • Promotes an impression of stability in the Yuan (well-founded or not).

Why would the West agree to this? (And I say “the West” because, let’s face it, Washington and London are pretty much the ones who will be deciding.) Because if China were to fail right now it would be a severe annoyance for the U.S. and a complete disaster for Europe and Russia. Nobody really knows what the fallout of that would be, but it wouldn’t be pretty.

The Yuan will be made a reserve currency, whether it makes sense or not, and whether it actually fits in the reserve currency club by the standards and rules the IMF itself has laid out. These are scary times and nobody has any good levers to pull to “fix the economy” so national governments and central banks are pulling at straws because there is simply nothing left to try. All the control rods have been yanked out and tossed already, or shoved in and locked tightly; all the red buttons have been mashed; all the hyperbolic rhetorical devices have been so over-used at this point that the only thing that might actually influence market participants is a frank exposition about the truth rather than more “we’ll do whatever it takes!” and other gung-ho, “it’ll work this time” and “this is the lastest of the last rounds of QE, and this time it will really be the most effectivest of effective measures… I promise!” blather.

[* China is due for two painful corrections which will likely occur together, as they are linked. The first is a political correction; China’s geography does not lend itself to a central command economy. The second is a property-claims correction; when basic goods cannot be had at any price it means the entire system is so out of whack due to government interventions that only a hard reset can fix things. This will likely take the form of a civil war, but who knows. It could be gradual decline toward state failure followed by a logical and non-violent nation-wide roundtable discussion, or even a bloodless revolution coupled with a voluntary capitulation of material holdings by the power elites. But seriously, this has never happened in history and there is no reason to expect China’s inevitable transitions to occur independently of one another, or for either to be non-violent.]

2015-2016 Energy Price Drop Will Disentangle Russia, Not Crush It

Energy prices are dropping. Commodity prices are dropping, actually, in general. Production is slowing. People are finally realizing that China is as flimsy as government construction. The Euro is indeed linking Eurozone economies by failure instead of success, and doing so in a way that limits their market rights. The EU is inherently unstable. Cold War II is finally no longer a secret (though many folks are still oblivious to it).

Long story short: a lot of stuff is going on!

This is one of those “interesting” periods in history — the kind that Chinese proverbs use as a curse. Or, rather, we are re-entering a normal period in history, one where there are more than two poles to the world, and the Cold War alignment stresses are not purely polarized — which means more interesting plays for middle empires (like France), and a very strong possibility that empires that are currently viewed as either permanently vanquished (Japan and Thailand) or part of the new world standard (China) are likely to either find a way to rise again, or endure complete collapse prior to changing form entirely upon resurrection.

Japan might realize the space play it could make by diverting public largess toward space instead of beautifully designing dead-end mountain roads. China will very likely endure a civil war, but it could just as easily be won by the standing government which changes form after it wins as it could be reformed as a republic under a totally different political concept. France my find a way to leverage its African empire to provide an energy alternative to Germany and thereby insulate it from Moscow’s control at the same time it forces it into a subordinate relationship (winning a Napoleonic victory without fighting a war — the way the Germans thought they were “re”winning WWI without fighting a war by imposing the Euro as the new European currency under their former central bank, renamed as the ECB). The Turks may find a way to leverage their water control position over Iraq and work to put ISIS in control of Baghdad as part of a bid to force them to normalize by giving them something that can be taken away. Tehran and Washington are very likely to become close allies. etc.

The world is changing.

Many folks feel guilty pleasure at watching Russian financial numbers decline and the ruble fall as energy prices sink worldwide. Folks think “ah, this is finally it, once Russia’s economy suffers enough, Moscow will have to agree to work with Washington and stop bullying the East so much”.

Well, that last part isn’t going to happen. Not because of energy prices, anyway. There are two reasons for this: Russia doesn’t need money the same way other countries do, and in some regions alternatives to Russian energy are impossible to obtain at any price.

The first point is that Russia is a raw-materials exporter, and also maintains a considerable high-tech domestic manufacturing capability. The reason we don’t see more Russian products in the world, though, is because Russia lack much heavy shipping infrastructure. In particular, its ability to push products to ocean ports is severely limited, so it will never make sense to produce finished goods in the interior of Russia, ship them by rail or truck overland to deep water ports (across hostile political lines, no less — if you think pre-Civil War inter-state tariffs were insane within the United States, imagine what they look like in the middle of a Cold War-style mutual embargo and tariff festival), and from there to the world. China is a much easier shortcut. On the other hand, it will always make sense to ship raw materials from the interior of Ukraine or Russia (which are effectively controlled by the same political decision-makers — even more obviously now than ten years ago), because raw materials can only be had at their sources.

A big part of Russia’s power comes not from being able to throw money around, but by being able to make client states become dependent on material subsidies from Russia. If the Russian’s are subsidizing gas at a certain price in Germany, then the existing infrastructure will be built with that in mind. That lowers the difficulty of obtaining and routing that energy source. That means it lowers the cost of extending that infrastructure and thus deepening systemic dependency on that source over time. That means Russia winds up with a lever of control. As long as nothing bad happens Russia will keep the gas flowing. Once things go their way or favors are refused gas lines might “suffer breakdowns” and prices might arbitrarily increase. It doesn’t matter if the global market price for natural gas is X if that gas is physically impossible to obtain in any significant quantity when you are talking about powering an entire national economy’s energy needs. The local spot price of the gas can be whatever Russia makes up — and if Russia wants to cause pain it can simple experience a series of conveniently timed technical difficulties.

The Russians of today can, as they have for the past several waves of their history, substitute labor for capital when necessary. The methods by which this is accomplished change a bit every generation — conforming to the expectations of the peasantry (and for all practical purposes Russia is still a country of peasants and royalty). A drop in the ruble is annoying, it prevents Moscow from keeping the charade of open engagement with Western economies alive, but does not fundamentally change the power relationship between the West and East, and certainly does not change the geopolitical calculus over the long-term.

France in Syria: Still Not Here to Save the World

Folks have been really excited about France getting into war-mode on Syria after the Paris attacks. People were even momentarily excited about Turkey’s decision to shoot down a Russian plane the other day. Now Paris and Moscow are maybe working together on hitting ISIS? While the Washington is doing the same thing?!?

Man, its like a giant peace party!

Wait… um… what? No. War is not the same thing as peace. Let’s be careful to remember that. Let’s also be careful to remember that “peace”, taken without any qualifications, is a meaningless, impossible, and downright harmful goal.

Some folks are very hopeful that France’s involvement in the Syrian conflict signals a Great Change in The Way Things Work. They hope that Paris will somehow “bring Moscow into the fold” because “now Paris understands terrorism”. Other even hope that now Paris will bring NATO together under a single purpose (other than simply being an anti-Russian alliance). Lovely hopes, but not really the way things are going to work out.

I don’t mean that Paris doesn’t understand terrorism, they totally understand it — to the point that Paris is expert at both resisting it and employing it where it makes sense. They understand it so well that they know that uniting NATO “against terrorism” would make about as much sense as uniting NATO against Middle Eastern kidnapping.

I’m not saying the French are evil, mind you, I am saying they are savvy. They get the way the game works. They have been on the ball, racking up a string of strategic victories in Africa over the last decade. They’ve re-established their “middle empire” (the “middle” being between Washington and Moscow) while Washington has been too preoccupied with chasing brown guys to notice. This indicates that while they know how to play terrorism for votes in domestic politics (they are too smart to care much about what outsiders think of them) they also know that making “terrorism” the target of a major military operation is totally ridiculous.

Terrorism is a tactic not an identity. You can’t target terrorism any more than you can target long-hand division or yoga. Terrorism is the “civil disruption” phase that a political movement goes through whenever a legitimate political course of action is not available. Consider the evolution of the PLO or Hezbollah. Unless you are over 40, you likely won’t even remember that those are the groups that were arch-terrorists before. Now they are political parties. Yasser Arafat, the PLO’s Dr. Evil himself, received a Nobel Peace Prize (not that the Peace Prize means anything). Hezbollah is a fantastically profitable global franchise operation now, only partially focused (by some measures) on imposing a political outcome in Lebanon (their purpose for existing is the subject of eternally flexible rhetoric — which means the real purpose for Hezbollah’s existence is simply the survival of Hezbollah at this point).

But what about this cooperation thing? France getting into Syria must require some coordination with Russia and the US, right? And NATO? Turkey is in NATO, the US is in NATO, France is (again, that is) in NATO… so what gives?

Coordination will be necessary to prevent more “friendly” (?) fire incidents, but its more the kind of coordination that seeks to prevent midair collisions as polits jockey for superior position against one other while they run their sorties against ground targets. Remember, Turkey just shot down a Russian plane — anyone in the sky above Syria right now is considering everything else in the sky and absolutely everyone on the ground to be a threat. Sounds weird? Well, it is. But that’s reality for you. You couldn’t make up a plot for a book more convoluted than the way the real world works.

France’s goals are still France’s goals. They are not American goals. Sure, a lot of Americans and French and non-French Europeans see things the same way for the moment — but that’s a common view held of mutually held anger at a third party than anything else. The immigration wave and xenophobia that is going to increasingly fuel will continue to drive a common view over the short term (not in the least because the nightmares fueled by fear of rampant Middle Eastern and African immigration are not without foundation, particularly when coupled with domestic population decline).

France’s goal is to maintain its middle empire and use it to force Berlin into a subordinate relationship with Paris. This goal has held steady since the creation of the Euro, and France has demonstrated an amazing amount of fortitude and clarity of direction in the realization of that goal — even more amazing considering the contentious nature of their electoral politics since the Soviet collapse. Germany being in NATO with France, being home to the ECB, being “friends” with France, etc. doesn’t really matter — the reason France and Germany have been enemies so long is still based on geography, and that still forces France and Germany to regard one another in terms of capacity instead of intent. France has the upper hand in military terms, and will the economy likely to crash the only lever Germany has (dependent entirely on imported energy) is likely to disappear, or fall under the indirect control of Paris anyway if France can create an energy alternative for Germany that isn’t Russian gas (which is why France worked to isolate Germany even more from practical alternatives by destroying Libya and demonstrating their practical ability to dominate North Africa (ENI’s gas fields) and the Mediterranean).

Russia’s goals are still Russia’s goals. Well, in Russia’s case it is even more clear that Russia’s goals are actually Moscow’s goals. That is also not going to change, and despite a lot of poorly disguised epicaricacy on behalf of Western powers, Russia’s financial problems based on dropping energy prices are actually more likely to make Russia turn into a deliberately confrontational, economically detached player than a compliant ally of the West. Russia is looking out for what its own survival in what it necessarily views a dark and dangerous world. The West world will soon find itself with even fewer levers to control Russia for the forseeable future.

So France “bringing Russia into the fold”? France “getting NATO on the same page” to lead a charge against dastardly terrorist types? Nope. That’s just as naive as hoping that Russia was either sincere about squashing ISIS or helping Assad (either goal would at least speed a non-ISIS resolution to the Syrian conflict — and life under Assad wasn’t nearly as screwed up as life in a civil war…). Syria is, for the moment, a useful problem for France. That doesn’t mean that French politicians won’t accidentally start believing their own rhetoric (the way the Americans did after the invasion of Iraq was over… whoops!), but unlike 2001, the world today is full of threats that are obviously more important than chasing brown guys. In view of the Cold War II / WWIII type issues at stake right now, if the Europeans get serious about “solving” terrorism they are much more likely to resort to historically typical European solutions such as mass deportation at spear-point, mass military impressment, mass concentration, or mass execution than believing that an air campaign is going to make anything change (well, maybe carpet bombing would have some effect…).

France is a lot more likely to play Syria partly to drive a wedge between Russia and NATO (particularly Germany and Turkey), partly to demonstrate to Russia that France is willing to deal (and has something worth dealing), partly to show Washington where the red lines are (without spoiling the relationship with AFRICOM), and partly for the domestic electoral lulz. Killing ISIS guys is always good press and all it costs (right now) is printing more money and a general disregard for collateral damage (which is, ironically, why the Americans are always going to be utterly ineffective — they are absolutely afraid to hurt anyone, and religious bad guys are very good at hiding in plain sight, right behind rows of school children). Aside from this there is a vast array of geopolitical opportunities open in Syria right now, because of how the Syrian play augments the Russian play in Armenia (to pressure Turkey and keep Georgia as an effective vassal). Syria has become an interesting stage upon which Cold War II politics is playing out — this act of it, anyway.

How the Internet of Things Will Change the World: Not by Much

Are you ready for the enormous, revolutionary, ground-shattering changes coming with the IoT?

If you said “yes” and by “yes” you meant you were prepared for breathtaking changes, you are a naive child wading in a murky pool of lampreys, your will putty in the hands of the same charlatans who brought you terms like “cloud computing” which still has yet to be defined in any concrete technical sense.

If you said “yes” and by “yes” you meant that you felt that the more things change the more they stay the same — then you are indeed prepared.

Cold War II, civil war in China, the breakup of the EU, abolishment of American drug laws, the DEA and an end to the Mexican civil war all at once — those are the kinds of things that will have a measurable impact on life. The so-called “internet of things” concept as heard in internet marketing is… well, not at all what the guy who coined the term “Internet of Things” meant.

We already have an internet of things. Has it cured cancer yet? Nope. But if we put RFID in every part of our bodies we will certainly be even more exposed to the will of outside actors. Not that the public has demonstrated that it cares about complete loss of its privacy, especially when “Google style conveniences in exchange for your life’s data” can be backed up by the rhetoric of fear necessitated by government “anti-terrorism” funding. (Yes, I mock this, and yes, I was a Green Beret in the US Army for 6 years — the direction that rhetoric is headed is toward government empowerment, and the government is exactly the least well equipped element of society to deal with terrorism.)

Want to see an internet of things? Tesla cars receive system updates across the network now, and can turn in performance data to help the maker improve on their designs and software. Open water jetski robots can follow automated routes and report hydrographic and bathyrithmic data back to a data processing facility to chart change over time. I was working on a (now defunct, but promising) design project to develop spotting scopes that were intelligent enough to peer data amongst one another within an operational space and change “spotter calls” into more generally interesting “shot requests” and aggregate shot providers in the area to engage targets based on type, effect and following damage reports. Whenever any peers had a network connection they could aggregate data externally.

Dude, we’re already there.

What we lack is standards. Oh, wait, nevermind… we actually have tens of thousands of those. What we lack is standards that people actually can use, that aren’t harder to learn and comply with than the handling of the basic user problems at hand are. These problems will mostly never be solved, not really. Truly understandable data must have a semantic foundation, and semantics are essentially arbitrary in most ways that matter in data processing. That means data must either be tagged in a non-trivial way or must be placed into a schema where relationships are what have meanings.

Note that “tagged in a non-trivial way” above means taking tagging systems to such extremes that they become their own ontologies. Think about that. It should make your face turn pale. That’s at least as difficult as developing an arbitrary formal language. (In case you didn’t notice, an “arbitrary formal” language is a oxymoron — though consortia and governments alike love nothing more than funding committee efforts to formalize the syntax of futile efforts in this area). Writing even trivial software using such a tagging system would require that programmers at every step of the system learn this arbitrary formal language of tagging before they do much of anything, and that’s a lot harder overall than just continuing on with our pile-of-ad-hoc-systems approach. Schema-based systems, while having some different tradeoffs (computationally natural descriptions of data as a “shape”, for example, is a really big win in practical application), ultimately suffer from the same complexity explosion at some level. In particular, applying a particular schema designed in the context of one problem domain will very often not fit in the context of another problem domain — and fully normalizing all data ever, ever would eventually require an infinite (and ever growing) number of relational definitions. Yech.

So… Internet of things? Yeah. We’re already living it. Don’t get too excited and don’t give into the hype. Just because you technically can read data from remote sensors or activate your house’s appliances with your phone (hint: you already can) doesn’t mean this is something you will want to do, or that the venture capitalists of the world will peel their lips off the adsearch cock for long enough to realize that there are more interesting things they could be funding than bounce-under ads and invisible iframe reclick-to-click javascript tech.

Rest easy. Humanity’s material circumstances will continue to get incrementally better (save the occasional dip due to predictably stupid things we do to ourselves) until The Singularity when we are all either suddenly eliminated due to obsolescence, or drive ourselves into a new mode of existence-as-slavery to whatever Google turns into (when all data is network accessible, privacy does not exist, all data is the private IP of a single aggregate, the rights of conscious uploaded entities don’t exist, the definition of “life” is still “way way way after birth”, and continued conscious existence equates to paying a service charge — that’s not really life). None of this is particularly dependent upon the hype surrounding the “Internet of Things”.

Turkey Responds to Russia: “No”

As I mentioned when Russian airstrikes in Syria began, the airstrikes have nothing to do with Assad and everything to do with keeping Washington distracted, maintaining the status quo in Syria (that is, prolonging the conflict), and pressuring Turkey (as an expansion on the already decades-old play of keeping Armenia at odds with Turkey and Azerbaijan).

The Russians did what militaries so often do when they want to present a pressuring posture and forced the issue by violating a political target’s airspace while in the course of some other operation (consider the US Navy’s recently deliberate disregard of what the Chinese claim are their “territorial waters” in the South China Sea — though the issue there is almost exactly reversed: the Chinese are the aggressors in the sense that they are laying claim to broad swathes of ocean over which Beijing has never had any practical control). Turkey decided to take the opportunity to send a message to both Moscow and Washington by shooting down a Russian jet.

The important message Ankara is sending is that they will not cooperate on any terms with Moscow, that Ankara still considers itself a Western-ally, and — perhaps most interestingly — forcing the public dialog to become, at least temporarily, about the geopolitical game that is going on instead of the incidental and petty distraction of Assad and ISIS that has been filling the news. ISIS has used terror tactics to get in the news lately (Paris made a big splash, after all), and now Turkey has used a similar technique, though not terrorism by any stretch, to change the focus of public reporting for at least a few days.

If Washington was waiting for a green light in the region before surprising everyone with a sudden shift from Arab to Persian support, this was it. The best move right now would be for Obama to show up in Tehran tomorrow, and Washington to flip sides overnight, both with regard to Tehran/Riyadh and ISIS/Assad. By getting on the Persian side of things Russia has nowhere to go, loses its lever in Iran, and has to (for the first time in two decades) react to Washington instead of being the initiator. The Israelis and Egyptians will play ball — they have before and they will again (and judging by Bibi’s deft use of hyperbolic rhetoric over the last few years, he’s ready to make a deal that let’s Tel Aviv relax), and Turkey is all but shouting out loud in plain language that its time to pinch the destabilizing issues at their source.

Whether anyone who is allowed to make a decision is paying attention is anyone’s guess — the last several years of American policy make me wonder if anyone is paying any attention at all… which is probably why Ankara is trying its hardest to force a focus on the strategic issues that underlie the future-changing alignment shifts in the region instead of letting the public dialog remain purely about peripheral issues like ISIS and Assad.