I just realized that it is futile to drop hints to my wife about, say, a snack before dinner. The master play is to talk about snacks with my kids before dinner, and they will always find a way to deliver the goods.
A question on the Worldbuilding SE site about military contractors / mercenaries / “evil henchmen” / whatever caught my attention and I responded. A discussion started between myself and another guy who has contracted before in the same places, but on the tech side of the business instead of PSD. I’m preserving the conversation here because it illustrates the point I was trying to make in my answer, but doesn’t really fit within the answer and will certainly be deleted by the mods:
@zxq9 I’m impressed by your answer. I worked as a contractor as well, and ran a bar at night in one country (Middle East). Lots of the guys I worked with were former Ranger / SF. I did tech instead of PSD, but some jobs we were responsible for our own security, travel, etc. All the guys I saw ended up going back to the States (or the Philippines…) after contracts; nobody really hung out in theater after jobs. Are those little communities you’ve referred to really that common? Because I’ve yet to see people hang around after the fact.
– hathead 15 mins ago
@hathead If you were ever in Baghdad you might remember that along the main E-W road between the traffic circle and Triple Canopy’s base Olympia was a mish-mashed neighborhood with a few shops and restaurants, and a couple of smaller contract company offices working out of houses. (Near the “Hot Tomato” restaurant that was always weird.) That neighborhood is exactly the sort of spot I’m talking about. Kabul has something similar. I think most of that may have been invisible to you if you didn’t work PSD or base def (and therefore have your own wheels) — but its there. Similar in Kampala.
– zxq9 10 mins ago
@zxq9 – I remember the neighborhood but didn’t spend a lot of time out there. People bought alcohol there. I worked on Bes-maya, I guess you know where that is. My glory days were in Kabul, though. There we all lived on the economy and would pop into the embassy / base to do work, or speed out to Bagram. Kabul was always weird- you can get whatever you needed and half the guys at the bar were wanna-be journalists. Tourists even popped in sometimes. This neighborhood you’re talking about in Baghdad – it seemed like it was within the confines of base (checkpoint controlled). Was it not?
– hathead 7 mins ago
@hathead I also forgot to mention… There are contracts in the southern Philippines, Indo, Malay, Cambodia and Thailand , too — and there are two SF association houses (the front half of which are really bars, like Garfield’s in AC and Tilac II in Pattaya). The neighborhoods near there are full of older SF guys who married locally and never left, and sometimes its easy to source logistics or meet the right folks to get a crew together locally. Pace of life is a bit slower there, but the shape of things is fairly similar — but not everyone wants to have anything to do with contracting.
– zxq9 6 mins ago
@hathead The neighborhood wasn’t, but right next to it was the former finance minister’s house and apartments for his wives — which was turned into a business development center. The edge of it was right on the NW edge of the circle and had walls + a guard force from TC (which I was in charge of for 6 months once). That place gave the impression the neighborhood was controlled, but it was just that one facility. The volume of alcohol trade there always surprised me! A lot better than the “parts cleaner” thing the Poles had going on down in al Kut.
– zxq9 3 mins ago edit
@zxq9 – half the ex-Army guys I worked with had houses in the Philippines. You probably know some of the same guys. It’s not easy getting work as a tech with a PMC but I managed to find it with a big name (closed now, but you’d know them) and it was a lot of fun. Hanging out in Turkey now. It’s not hot enough yet that a worthwhile expat community has established. Yet.
– hathead 2 mins ago
@zxq9 – The Europeans had fine alcohol, it was just a matter of finding it. They had a bar on Liberty that was wild. Panties stapled to the ceiling. I only saw it once; kept out of that sort of thing mostly. Did brew my own beer, though.
– hathead 1 min ago
@hathead Likely do know some of the same folks. They’ll put this thread in chat or delete it pretty soon. My url is the same as my alias here: zxq9.com . Drop me a line. Turkey is an interesting place right now, too!
– zxq9 46 secs ago
@zxq9 – I’ll drop you a line, and delete my previous chats if I’m still able.
So, indeed the Yuan was made into a reserve currency and the link-by-failure is already being established. It is interesting, though, that the bulk of the value transfer involved is coming from the Euro, not the Dollar or Yen. Linked by the IMF formally or not, though, if either the Euro or the Yuan fail over the mid-term the other will as well. The Chinese and Eurozone economies are intimately linked already, but were linked more by success than failure until now. That the failure of either is a very real possibility is too terrifying for the financial press to discuss, I think, and it is a political landmine public figures are trying very hard to avoid mentioning. It even seems that the made-up nature of Chinese government economic estimates isn’t even in the news much these days. You would think that little detail might enter into the discussion about adding a new currency to the IMF’s reserve currency group.
There is no longer a strong relationship among basic aspects of value assignment, legal ownership, practical control (that is, “real ownership”), vested business interest in terms of the performance value of concerns, and available goods and services in either the Eurozone or Chinese markets. While there are no recipes for economic success, there are several recipes for disaster (ask an economist about this — their responses tend to be as enlightening and humorous as they are depressing on reflection). A lack of correlation between various forms of utility values and assigned values is one of the disaster recipes. There is no easy way to fix this other than a kinetic re-establishment of property rights, and that means there is nothing left to do in the current situation than hope that when they do fail, they fail cleanly. But historically there is no such thing as a clean failure (in theory, of course, all sorts of lovely solutions exist).
Dropping an anvil on the overloaded camel’s back in the Eurozone or China would be rather easy at the moment, as both economies are in precarious situations. In fact, inducing a major market collapse would be so easy right now that failure is almost certain to come as the result of a deliberate action from an external player than by mere circumstance. The more players who realize this is true the more likely such an action becomes: why let a failure happen to you when you can be the one making it happen if the event is inevitable?
In describing the European and Chinese economic situations a financial analyst friend of mine used the phrase “poised to fail” (along with a lot of depressed-looking facepalming). When someone says that to a geopolitical analyst, though, ears perk up. There is always opportunity to be found in crisis, and sometimes when crisis is inevitable the best play is to be the cause of it yourself, because then you are the only one truly prepared. Consider the economic fallout of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008. A similar performance is absolutely not out of the question, nor is having some “terrorists” conveniently demonstrate the peaceful nature of some religion all over a ship in the Strait of Malacca at a perfectly horrible moment.
There really isn’t anything to do about what is going on with the Yuan, really. This course was set about 20 years ago (yes, all the way back in 1995 — after the Cold War, after the first post-Tienanmen Square Five Year Plan was in action; as China started on its “Money is Good” -> “Expansion Above All” -> “Don’t Stop the Train” -> “WTO Rules? Screw the rules, I have money!” chain of policies). The general trend will continue, as none of the players seems to have any inkling of how to change the rules of the game — and the trend is of the end of a decades-long political and financial cycle. The way these stories end is never happy.
Every end is a new beginning, and that’s what is really worth focusing on. That may sound like small comfort (and it is), but if you already know things are going to get worse before they get better, then at least you won’t find yourself sleeping in a bed of broken dreams. It is too soon to tell which way this Jenga tower is going to topple, but we are nearing the end of this round of the game.
The IMF is considering adding the Yuan to the group of reserve currencies. That would put it alongside the U.S. Dollar, the Japanese Yen, the English Pound, and the Euro in terms of “officially perceived” stash-your-value-here viability. As far as actual criteria for inclusion go, the Canadian Dollar, Australian Dollar, and very likely the Russian Ruble are probably actually closer to being genuine reserve currency material than the Chinese Yuan.
China is much closer to a total financial collapse and internal civil disruption* than recovery and stability in its current form. Long-term, of course, China will still be right where it is and the people there will still be Chinese (but there will eventually be far fewer of them, at least for a few generations). A Chinese collapse right now would be a major disaster for everyone. The commodity markets are depressed more than they have been for several decades (in relative terms, actually, I’m not sure that we actually have a post-WWII precedent for what is happening), energy is cheap, credit is massively overleveraged, and yet people aren’t buying enough stuff to keep the wheels spinning.
What does that have to do with the Yuan becoming a reserve currency? It does three things:
- Gives China access to an external aggregate value device to prop up the yuan if necessary (links their economy to everyone else’s by failure, similar to the way subsidies can do this within a national economy). This effect is actually more a hoped-for psychological effect on the market than a tangible superpower China is being granted by the rays of a yellow sun.
- Makes the Yuan a necessary holding for anyone trying to carry a balanced basket of reserve currencies (temporarily spikes demand for the Yuan).
- Promotes an impression of stability in the Yuan (well-founded or not).
Why would the West agree to this? (And I say “the West” because, let’s face it, Washington and London are pretty much the ones who will be deciding.) Because if China were to fail right now it would be a severe annoyance for the U.S. and a complete disaster for Europe and Russia. Nobody really knows what the fallout of that would be, but it wouldn’t be pretty.
The Yuan will be made a reserve currency, whether it makes sense or not, and whether it actually fits in the reserve currency club by the standards and rules the IMF itself has laid out. These are scary times and nobody has any good levers to pull to “fix the economy” so national governments and central banks are pulling at straws because there is simply nothing left to try. All the control rods have been yanked out and tossed already, or shoved in and locked tightly; all the red buttons have been mashed; all the hyperbolic rhetorical devices have been so over-used at this point that the only thing that might actually influence market participants is a frank exposition about the truth rather than more “we’ll do whatever it takes!” and other gung-ho, “it’ll work this time” and “this is the lastest of the last rounds of QE, and this time it will really be the most effectivest of effective measures… I promise!” blather.
[* China is due for two painful corrections which will likely occur together, as they are linked. The first is a political correction; China’s geography does not lend itself to a central command economy. The second is a property-claims correction; when basic goods cannot be had at any price it means the entire system is so out of whack due to government interventions that only a hard reset can fix things. This will likely take the form of a civil war, but who knows. It could be gradual decline toward state failure followed by a logical and non-violent nation-wide roundtable discussion, or even a bloodless revolution coupled with a voluntary capitulation of material holdings by the power elites. But seriously, this has never happened in history and there is no reason to expect China’s inevitable transitions to occur independently of one another, or for either to be non-violent.]
Energy prices are dropping. Commodity prices are dropping, actually, in general. Production is slowing. People are finally realizing that China is as flimsy as government construction. The Euro is indeed linking Eurozone economies by failure instead of success, and doing so in a way that limits their market rights. The EU is inherently unstable. Cold War II is finally no longer a secret (though many folks are still oblivious to it).
Long story short: a lot of stuff is going on!
This is one of those “interesting” periods in history — the kind that Chinese proverbs use as a curse. Or, rather, we are re-entering a normal period in history, one where there are more than two poles to the world, and the Cold War alignment stresses are not purely polarized — which means more interesting plays for middle empires (like France), and a very strong possibility that empires that are currently viewed as either permanently vanquished (Japan and Thailand) or part of the new world standard (China) are likely to either find a way to rise again, or endure complete collapse prior to changing form entirely upon resurrection.
Japan might realize the space play it could make by diverting public largess toward space instead of beautifully designing dead-end mountain roads. China will very likely endure a civil war, but it could just as easily be won by the standing government which changes form after it wins as it could be reformed as a republic under a totally different political concept. France my find a way to leverage its African empire to provide an energy alternative to Germany and thereby insulate it from Moscow’s control at the same time it forces it into a subordinate relationship (winning a Napoleonic victory without fighting a war — the way the Germans thought they were “re”winning WWI without fighting a war by imposing the Euro as the new European currency under their former central bank, renamed as the ECB). The Turks may find a way to leverage their water control position over Iraq and work to put ISIS in control of Baghdad as part of a bid to force them to normalize by giving them something that can be taken away. Tehran and Washington are very likely to become close allies. etc.
The world is changing.
Many folks feel guilty pleasure at watching Russian financial numbers decline and the ruble fall as energy prices sink worldwide. Folks think “ah, this is finally it, once Russia’s economy suffers enough, Moscow will have to agree to work with Washington and stop bullying the East so much”.
Well, that last part isn’t going to happen. Not because of energy prices, anyway. There are two reasons for this: Russia doesn’t need money the same way other countries do, and in some regions alternatives to Russian energy are impossible to obtain at any price.
The first point is that Russia is a raw-materials exporter, and also maintains a considerable high-tech domestic manufacturing capability. The reason we don’t see more Russian products in the world, though, is because Russia lack much heavy shipping infrastructure. In particular, its ability to push products to ocean ports is severely limited, so it will never make sense to produce finished goods in the interior of Russia, ship them by rail or truck overland to deep water ports (across hostile political lines, no less — if you think pre-Civil War inter-state tariffs were insane within the United States, imagine what they look like in the middle of a Cold War-style mutual embargo and tariff festival), and from there to the world. China is a much easier shortcut. On the other hand, it will always make sense to ship raw materials from the interior of Ukraine or Russia (which are effectively controlled by the same political decision-makers — even more obviously now than ten years ago), because raw materials can only be had at their sources.
A big part of Russia’s power comes not from being able to throw money around, but by being able to make client states become dependent on material subsidies from Russia. If the Russian’s are subsidizing gas at a certain price in Germany, then the existing infrastructure will be built with that in mind. That lowers the difficulty of obtaining and routing that energy source. That means it lowers the cost of extending that infrastructure and thus deepening systemic dependency on that source over time. That means Russia winds up with a lever of control. As long as nothing bad happens Russia will keep the gas flowing. Once things go their way or favors are refused gas lines might “suffer breakdowns” and prices might arbitrarily increase. It doesn’t matter if the global market price for natural gas is X if that gas is physically impossible to obtain in any significant quantity when you are talking about powering an entire national economy’s energy needs. The local spot price of the gas can be whatever Russia makes up — and if Russia wants to cause pain it can simple experience a series of conveniently timed technical difficulties.
The Russians of today can, as they have for the past several waves of their history, substitute labor for capital when necessary. The methods by which this is accomplished change a bit every generation — conforming to the expectations of the peasantry (and for all practical purposes Russia is still a country of peasants and royalty). A drop in the ruble is annoying, it prevents Moscow from keeping the charade of open engagement with Western economies alive, but does not fundamentally change the power relationship between the West and East, and certainly does not change the geopolitical calculus over the long-term.
Are you ready for the enormous, revolutionary, ground-shattering changes coming with the IoT?
If you said “yes” and by “yes” you meant you were prepared for breathtaking changes, you are a naive child wading in a murky pool of lampreys, your will putty in the hands of the same charlatans who brought you terms like “cloud computing” which still has yet to be defined in any concrete technical sense.
If you said “yes” and by “yes” you meant that you felt that the more things change the more they stay the same — then you are indeed prepared.
Cold War II, civil war in China, the breakup of the EU, abolishment of American drug laws, the DEA and an end to the Mexican civil war all at once — those are the kinds of things that will have a measurable impact on life. The so-called “internet of things” concept as heard in internet marketing is… well, not at all what the guy who coined the term “Internet of Things” meant.
We already have an internet of things. Has it cured cancer yet? Nope. But if we put RFID in every part of our bodies we will certainly be even more exposed to the will of outside actors. Not that the public has demonstrated that it cares about complete loss of its privacy, especially when “Google style conveniences in exchange for your life’s data” can be backed up by the rhetoric of fear necessitated by government “anti-terrorism” funding. (Yes, I mock this, and yes, I was a Green Beret in the US Army for 6 years — the direction that rhetoric is headed is toward government empowerment, and the government is exactly the least well equipped element of society to deal with terrorism.)
Want to see an internet of things? Tesla cars receive system updates across the network now, and can turn in performance data to help the maker improve on their designs and software. Open water jetski robots can follow automated routes and report hydrographic and bathyrithmic data back to a data processing facility to chart change over time. I was working on a (now defunct, but promising) design project to develop spotting scopes that were intelligent enough to peer data amongst one another within an operational space and change “spotter calls” into more generally interesting “shot requests” and aggregate shot providers in the area to engage targets based on type, effect and following damage reports. Whenever any peers had a network connection they could aggregate data externally.
Dude, we’re already there.
What we lack is standards. Oh, wait, nevermind… we actually have tens of thousands of those. What we lack is standards that people actually can use, that aren’t harder to learn and comply with than the handling of the basic user problems at hand are. These problems will mostly never be solved, not really. Truly understandable data must have a semantic foundation, and semantics are essentially arbitrary in most ways that matter in data processing. That means data must either be tagged in a non-trivial way or must be placed into a schema where relationships are what have meanings.
Note that “tagged in a non-trivial way” above means taking tagging systems to such extremes that they become their own ontologies. Think about that. It should make your face turn pale. That’s at least as difficult as developing an arbitrary formal language. (In case you didn’t notice, an “arbitrary formal” language is a oxymoron — though consortia and governments alike love nothing more than funding committee efforts to formalize the syntax of futile efforts in this area). Writing even trivial software using such a tagging system would require that programmers at every step of the system learn this arbitrary formal language of tagging before they do much of anything, and that’s a lot harder overall than just continuing on with our pile-of-ad-hoc-systems approach. Schema-based systems, while having some different tradeoffs (computationally natural descriptions of data as a “shape”, for example, is a really big win in practical application), ultimately suffer from the same complexity explosion at some level. In particular, applying a particular schema designed in the context of one problem domain will very often not fit in the context of another problem domain — and fully normalizing all data ever, ever would eventually require an infinite (and ever growing) number of relational definitions. Yech.
Rest easy. Humanity’s material circumstances will continue to get incrementally better (save the occasional dip due to predictably stupid things we do to ourselves) until The Singularity when we are all either suddenly eliminated due to obsolescence, or drive ourselves into a new mode of existence-as-slavery to whatever Google turns into (when all data is network accessible, privacy does not exist, all data is the private IP of a single aggregate, the rights of conscious uploaded entities don’t exist, the definition of “life” is still “way way way after birth”, and continued conscious existence equates to paying a service charge — that’s not really life). None of this is particularly dependent upon the hype surrounding the “Internet of Things”.
I live in Japan. The new Japanese trailer for Star Wars that I saw today was not the same as the new English one that I was shown on a website. Huh?
Disney is apparently doing a striptease by varying what they show in different language versions. Sneaky — and probably a really good strategy. As immune as I generally am to trailers, this is still pretty badass. Its Star Wars after all:
In marketing as in sex, it seems, being teased is at least half the fun.
I’m going to be enormously pissed if I actually go to the trouble to see this in the theater out here and it sucks. I don’t imagine it will suck, but that’s the problem with being teased too intensely — once the main event has begun all that teasing just leads to a huge letdown if she’s only as exciting as a pretty pillow (yeah that’s a real thing, with its own wikipedia page…). Too much anticipation can make an otherwise pretty good experience seem cheap.
I really hope this isn’t Episode I all over again.
This is a story about four people: Everybody, Somebody, Anybody and Nobody.
There was an important job to be done and Everybody was asked to do it.
Everybody was sure that Somebody would do it.
Anybody could have done it, but Nobody did.
Somebody got angry because it was Everybody’s job.
Everybody knew that Anybody could do it, but Nobody realised that Somebody wouldn’t do it.
And Everybody blamed Somebody when Nobody did what Anybody could have done.
When we want to discourage people from smoking we levy taxes on cigarettes. When we want to discourage people from drinking we levy taxes on alcohol. When we want to discourage the purchase of a product from a particular country we levy taxes on their imports.
What should we interpret as the motivation behind taxes on businesses? Businesses of a particular size? Income? Income of a particular size?
None of this has a happy ending.
StackOverflow, StackExchange, etc. and its whole community rather saddens me these days. It seems the assburgers who dump their angst on Wikipedia have found a new home making StackExchange sites as unfun as possible. The situation isn’t helped at all by the recent rabbit-like proliferation of SE sites which exhibit so much subject overlap as to make determining the “proper” place of most posts nearly impossible — all that has done is given the Post Police reason, in every case, to force re-posting, closing, pausing, deletion, or otherwise official vandalism of valid posts and answers.
Let’s say I have a question about travelling to Austria to see historical sites. Let’s put it in travel. But if the question is phrased in such a way as to reference a specific historical event, like say a little battle in which Polish king demonstrated how much he appreciated the Ottoman visitors, then it is an almost certain thing that some twerp who knows nothing about history or travelling in Austria will promptly vote to close or move the question on the grounds that it belongs on the SE site for history and not travel. The post will face the same fate once it arrives there, of course, and the asker will be helpless.
This sort of thing goes on all the time between StackOverflow, “Programmers”, and “Workplace” as many questions professional programmers have cut sharply across all three lines.
Another annoyance is unnecessary Post Police comments like the one left on this post. Sure, I was being silly in the way I did it, but my response represents the general consensus of the Erlang community on this particular subject and is, in essence, a fairly standard response. Obviously not good enough for 19-year-old Alexy Schmalko, Protector of the Realm.
Whatever happened to the sense of community I used to get from, you know, the community? Did that all die when usenet got retarded in the early 90’s? Did it evaporate with the coming of the cool web kids? I’ve probably got kids somewhere near his age…